

FAST Update

Somalia

Quarterly Risk Assessment
May to September 2004

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
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Contact FAST:
Phone: +41 31 330 12 04
Fax: +41 31 330 12 13
<mailto:FAST@swisspeace.ch>
www.swisspeace.org/fast

Country Expert:
[Ulf Terlinden](#)

Country Stability and Relative Forceful Actions




Average number of reported events per month: 125

Indicators: see appendix

Risk Assessment:

- The graphs indicate that Somalia's Country Stability and Relative Forceful Actions have remained on a deteriorated level since the premature signing of a Transitional Charter dead-locked the Somali National Reconciliation Conference (SNRC) in Mbagathi/Kenya in July 2003. Though the conference remained the focal point of political developments in the country, it was undermined for a long time by the absence of a number of key faction leaders, by continuing violations of the cease-fire agreement and an awkward management of the conference. By May 2004, the process had lost any sense of clarity of what had actually been agreed by whom and how the agreements should be interpreted in the course of implementation. The dire financial situation added to the general impression that the process was on the verge of collapse.
- Yet by choosing a more directive and assertive approach, the IGAD Facilitation Committee by late June 2004 pushed the endorsement of a compromise Transitional Charter through. Most faction leaders returned by July, coinciding with a raised level of "stability" and reduced Relative Forceful Actions (while conflictual and escalatory actions rose continuously since April 2004, see page 5). The ensuing slump in the stability graph concurs with the loss of momentum during the selection of the future parliamentarians (based on the existing 4.5 clan formula). The conference adopted a 15-member National Arbitration Committee late June to speed up the resolution of remaining differences with regard to power-sharing. But members of the new Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP) were not sworn in before later in August. A speaker was elected thereafter.
- The warlords managed to replace genuine traditional elders and civil society representatives with their own loyalists, effectively curtailing the influence and participation of non-militant actors. Political leaders (warlords) and politicians selected the MPs, with the traditional leaders acting as the endorsement authority only. Given the imbalance of power between them, this will have worked further in favour of the warlords. Not surprisingly, most faction leaders were selected into parliament.
- On October 10, Abdullahi Yussuf, the Darod- Majerteen president of the self-declared autonomous region of Puntland, was elected President of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia. He lacks acceptance outside his clan and has no power basis in the capital. Abdullahi Yussuf's governance track record raises serious questions on his future role in the peace process. With Ethiopian support, he militarily fought his way back to power in Puntland after his term as president had ended in 2001. His leadership style is known to be authoritarian and there are accounts of media repression in Puntland.
- The challenge is to build a competent government and at the same time to accommodate the most influential potential spoilers, the warlords. The moment of truth for the TFG will arrive when it is known who will *not* be on board after the Prime Minister, who is expected to be a Hawiye and will be chosen by Abdullahi Yussuf, selects his cabinet and distributes top government posts and funds. Many "leaders" have either been coerced or tempted into agreement with the transitional charter because they see it as a means to consolidate rather than to share or give up their power. One should not assume that a sore loser will voluntarily respect a cease-fire that so many have already disregarded. Furthermore, there is no consensus as to how precisely the TFG is to relate to existing local and regional governance structures.
- Civil society is weak and only emerging. It cannot provide checks and balances on the TFG and often appears as little more than a charitable extension of businessmen and warlords, confined to their clans and with policies corrupted by clientelism.
- Abdullahi Yussuf's election raises the question whether and how he will be replaced in Puntland, which he essentially ruled as a "one man show" and which has been characterized by serious, recently intensified internal divisions and tensions.
- Hardliners on either side of the conflict on Somaliland's status are likely to feel their perceptions confirmed by Abdullahi Yussuf's election. However, its actual repercussions are difficult to predict. So far, the conflict has been neglected entirely, but the creation of the TFG and Abdullahi Yussuf's election will elevate the conflict back to the "national" arena and raises domestic and international attention. Abdullahi Yussuf can choose to display his leadership skills by approaching the issue constructively or give in to the obvious temptation of antagonizing Somaliland further in an effort to unite the South behind him. Puntland's occupation of the contested areas under Abdullahi Yussuf's rule, and expectations on the new president to unite the country, certainly bar him from any kind of "neutral" mediator's role.

IDEA Average International Conflict and Cooperation




Average number of reported events per month: 125

Indicators: see appendix

Risk Assessment:

- At the peak of the SNRC's crisis in April/May 2004, it became apparent that the international community was desperate for a conclusion of the process. Funds and patience were running out, and the IGAD ministers threatened to "refer" Somalia back to the UN Security Council (UNSC) and/or the African Union (AU). However, it was clear that neither the regional body, nor the rest of the world, could actually afford to declare another failure. So after months of foot dragging on all sides, the international community finally mustered greater priority for the Somali issue. As a result, the reporting period is characterized by increased attention and ensuing pressure towards Somalia, here reflected in the rise of the Average International Conflict curve. It is worthwhile to note that the United States showed strikingly little engagement.
- IGAD governments showed greater commitment (frequent high-level meetings) and increasingly addressed the Somali conflict together. The organisation and its Facilitation Committee (IFC) also became more involved, directive and assertive. Museveni's and Kibaki's immediate involvement at the Safari Park Conference, and the IGAD Ministerial Committee's direct talks with the clan caucuses in June testify to that. In July, the chairman of the IFC even threatened to distribute the delegates' seats if the clans kept dragging their nominations. Not surprisingly, IGAD's tougher stance has earned it accusations of undue interference, particularly in the selection of the MPs and with the arbitration committee. While this certainly pushed the conclusion of the SNRC forward, it may have been at the expense of process ownership and outcomes.
- In line with these observations, the reporting period also witnessed an unprecedented level of sanctions in support of the SNRC's goals. Serious pressure arose when Kenya declined to accept Somali passports by mid-April. Though the move was officially based on obvious fears of forged passports, it was interpreted by many as an attempt to apply pressure on the Somali delegates. Following an earlier proposal by IGAD and support from the UNSC in July, IGAD threatened targeted sanctions against General Morgan early September to stop his military advances towards Kismayo. He eventually returned, yet only after IGAD settled his costly hotel bill at the Hilton in Nairobi and after he suffered a serious repulse on the battlefield.
- In August, the UNSC condemned continuing violations of the arms embargo and extended the mandate of its monitoring group by another six months. The group noted a decrease of arms transfers by air, but highlighted the need to regulate dhow traffic and to tackle money laundering across the region. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan visited Mbagathi in July.
- The AU declared its readiness to deploy military observers at an appropriate time and dispatched its second reconnaissance mission in August. Abdullahi Yussuf requested international troops for the implementation of the peace process but given the dreadful experience of UNOSOM II, this is met with antipathy inside Somalia and among potential troop contributors abroad.
- Somaliland's potential recognition remains a particularly burning issue in the international community's approach. During the SNRC's crisis, Somaliland received increasingly cooperative attention, especially from the UK. But the overall picture will change to some extent now that the TFG - regardless of its performance and unconditional of reconciliation with Somaliland - will likely receive full recognition, while the Somaliland government, despite its remarkable peace and governance track-record, does not. It is a pressing, but largely ignored challenge to adequately balance external political and financial support to both governments. Progress in the South must not be achieved at the expense of peace and stability in the North. Much will depend on the application of international pressure towards a reconciliation process between Somaliland and the South. As Somaliland's and Abdullahi Yussuf's strongest common supporter, Ethiopia seems to be particularly well-placed to mediate.
- As a very close ally of Somalia's powerful neighbour Ethiopia and as a self-declared supporter of the US war on terror, the new president has a much better footing to gain international support than the defunct TNG. Perhaps more importantly, *his* future opponents will at least lack this particular, powerful support. While this is favourable to the establishment of the TFG, it also hints at how the new president got into office and that he - like all of his predecessors - will be far more dependent and thus accountable to foreign powers than to the Somali people. Hence the challenge for the international community is to support the TFG in ways that promote local accountability and guard against the almost inevitable funding of clientelistic networks and divisional politics. Careful monitoring, scrutiny, and a high degree of political attention and conditionality will be indispensable to that end.

Cooperative, Conflictual, and Escalatory Actions



Average number of reported events per month: 125

Indicators: see appendix

Risk Assessment:

- Conflictual and Escalatory Actions throughout Somalia increased steadily since July while the Cooperative curve decreased significantly. Much of this violence, particularly in urban centres and specifically when related to territorial control, must be interpreted as struggles for power at the respective levels. It is only too evident that the pattern of control in place when a new government formally takes office will greatly influence the share of the “cake” that each group will have in the longer run.
- Mogadishu continued to be a centre of fierce fighting, particularly in May when in a combination of several battles more than a hundred people were killed. This included fighting between the factions of Mohammed Omar Habib’s ally Bashir Raghe and Muse Sudi Yalahow, the latter being a prominent absentee from the SNRC at the time. These battles raised extraordinary international attention because they coincided with a peak of the crisis in the conference and took a particularly high blood toll resulting from the use of heavy weaponry. The conflicts centred on the control of a hotel and an important port in Northern Mogadishu.
- Heavy fighting also occurred in Bula Hawo (Gedo) early in June, when an intra-SNF/Marehan conflict over the control of local checkpoints left 59 people dead, leading to substantial displacement in and around the town, as well as into nearby Kenya.
- The third major confrontation occurred in Lower Jubba during September, when troops under the command of General Morgan advancing in an effort to retake control of Kismayo clashed with units of the Jubba Valley Alliance (JVA). The campaign, which left more than 30 people dead and initially posed a serious blow to progress at the SNRC, ironically turned out to boost the peace process when Morgan’s forces were repulsed and he had to surrender to the Kenyan authorities at the border. The General has meanwhile rejoined the conference.
- Other local fighting occurred early in June in Afgoye, 30 km south of Mogadishu, leaving seven people dead; mid-June around Kismayo port, killing six; and between factions of the Digil-Mirifle clan in Dinsoor in mid-August, taking a toll of 20 lives.
- Although another round of fighting occurred in Baidoa early June, reportedly killing six, local mediation efforts meanwhile seem to have achieved major progress. Reports say militias of Shatigudud’s wing of the Rahanweyn Resistance Army (RRA) were for the first time allowed back into Baidoa town recently.
- Despite progress at the SNRC, it must not be overlooked that the tensions between the strongest governance structures that emerged from the former Somali Republic, Somaliland and Puntland, continued to escalate during the assessment period. A fire fight between forces of both sides on 22.09.2004 near Las Anod does not seem to have taken a high blood toll; however, this is not indicative of the gravity of this neglected conflict. Puntland forces have effectively occupied large chunks of the two Eastern Regions that Somaliland claims as its former colonial territory.
- Apart from local violent confrontations, Somalia is likely to go through a “wait and see” period during the next few weeks and months. That does not exclude warlords’ forceful actions to underline their claims to the pie, but one would not expect this to take the shape of large-scale fighting for some time to come, unless by unintended escalation. But the larger picture resulting from the conclusion of the SNRC will be determined by the composition of the profiteering versus the disappointed camp, and the assistance that interested external parties make available to the latter. Those who fail to get something out of the new government will stick to the guns where and when they have the capabilities to do so. This will certainly include his Puntland rival Jama Ali Jama and radical Islamist groups. The president’s declared intent to disarm the militia appears elusive and no effort has been made to kick off a serious reconciliation process on the ground. Therefore, much of the agreement’s sustainability will depend on the establishment of effective monitoring and sanctions regimes to guard against future violations of the cease-fire.

Appendix : Description of indicators used | Page 6

Variable Name	Description / Definition
All Events	IDEA categories: a count of all coded events with WEIS cue categories ranging from 1 to 22 (all WEIS cue categories) plus an additional 11 IDEA event cue categories (Event type: 'other').
All Actions	WEIS categories: a count of all coded events with cue categories ranging from 1 to 22 (all WEIS cue categories).
Forceful Actions	The indicator Forceful Actions depicts all reported uses of physical force by any actor. This includes non-injury destructive acts, non-military injury-destruction, and military engagement.
Relative Forceful Actions	Proportion of Forceful Action events compared to All Direct Actions. The indicator Forceful Actions depicts all reported uses of physical force by any actor. This includes non-injury destructive acts, non-military injury-destruction, and military engagement.
Conflict Carrying Capacity	The Conflict Carrying Capacity (or CCC) is a composed index that depicts the overall stability of the country or region of interest. The CCC is operationalized in terms of the multiplicative interaction among three Proportional measures: (1) civil contentiousness or the Proportion of civil actions that are reported as contentious or "direct" and thus challenge (at least implicitly) the state's monopoly on conflict regulation; (2) state repression or the Proportion of state actions that are reported as extra-institutional or "direct" both in response to direct challenges from the civil sector and those initiated by the state to repress and control opposition; and (3) violent contention or the Proportion of actions entailing physical damage to persons or property. the index is scaled between 0 and 1, where 1 means high and 0 low stability.
Country Stability	The country stability index is another version of the CCC measure with minor changes in order to improve the responsiveness of the index to events that influence the stability of a country.
Cooperative	Proportion of all actions belonging to all cooperative categories yield, comment consult, approve, promise, grant, reward, agree, request, and propose to all actions (all Events belonging to the 22 WEIS cue categories).
Conflictual	Proportion of all actions belonging to all conflictive categories reject, accuse, protest, deny, demand, warn, threaten, demonstrate, reduce relationships, expel, seize, and force to all actions (all Events belonging to the 22 WEIS cue categories).
Escalatory	Proportion of all actions belonging to the conflictive categories reject, accuse, protest, deny, demand, warn, and threaten to all actions (all Events belonging to the 22 WEIS cue categories).
IDEA	IDEA indicators are used to display Proportions of conflict and cooperation events in time. Each event category is assigned a IDEA rating (value).
IDEA Average	The Average indicator is a cumulative average of all events that are classified with a positive or negative value by IDEA 's conflict/cooperation scale. The indicator displays the mean of the conflict/cooperation event values, excluding all zero value events.
IDEA Average International Conflict	The Average International Conflict indicator displays the cumulative average of the negative (IDEA) values of all conflictive interstate or international events in a specific time period (means the sum of the negative IDEA values divided by the total number of conflictive international events). For interpretation purposes we take the absolute values (means positive values).
IDEA Average International Cooperation	The Average International Cooperation indicator displays the cumulative average of the positive (IDEA) values of all cooperative interstate or international events in a specific time period (means the sum of the positive IDEA values divided by the total number of cooperative international events).

Who are we?

FAST (German acronym for “Early Analysis of Tensions and Fact-finding”) is the early warning project of swisspeace, based in Berne, Switzerland. In 1998 the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) assigned swisspeace to set up a political early warning system for early identification of impending armed conflict and political crisis situations.

What do we want?

FAST aims to enhance political decision makers’ ability to identify critical developments in a timely manner, so that coherent political strategies can be formulated either to prevent or limit destructive effects of violent conflict or to identify opportunities for peacebuilding.

How do we work?

FAST uses both quantitative and qualitative methods for its analysis. The centerpiece in the quantitative analysis is based on event data analysis and the respective tools developed in the framework of the Program on Nonviolent Sanctions and Cultural Survival (PONSACS) at Harvard University. The logic of event data analysis is fairly simple: all events considered relevant to conflict escalation and de-escalation are assigned a certain numeric value according to a distinct conflict scale. These values can then be added up for specific time intervals and graphically displayed in a curve over time. The quality and quantity of data input is crucial for the success of such a method. In order to gather the quality and quantity of data required to suit early warning purposes, FAST sets up its own local information networks (LINS) and thus overcomes shortcomings of existing information sources (e.g., international news wires). A unique set of data is collected for each country completely independently from Western news-media coverage. For qualitative data analysis, FAST contracts internationally renowned country experts.

What are our products?

FAST products are risk assessments tailored to individual customers’ needs. The standard product (“FAST Update”) consists of three to five charts depicting the latest conflict related trends and a concise expert interpretation. As the time-series of collected data grow, FAST analysts will apply statistical methods to go beyond retrospective description and forecast future developments. FAST Updates are available in either hard copy or electronic form, covering time intervals as chosen by the customer.

Which countries do we monitor?

Africa: Angola, Burundi, DRC/Kivu region, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Mozambique, Rwanda, Somalia

Asia: Afghanistan, India/Kashmir, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Nepal, North Caucasus region, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan

Europe: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro

Middle East: Palestine